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contributed useful comments and suggestions for which I am most grateful.
Introduction1
Since the late 1980s, the US arms industry has been characterized by far-reaching changes in
technology, technique and organizational structure.  Shaped by the material requirements of the so-
called ‘military-technical revolution’, as well as by the discourses of ‘flexibility’ and ‘globalization’,
during the 1990s postfordist production techniques began to displace the set of manufacturing
techniques that had long been considered ‘best practice’ in the American arms industry.  As a result,
a new arms production paradigm – now commonly referred to as ‘agile manufacturing’ – has
coalesced.  This new paradigm is still is still in embryonic form, of course, and it is likely to evolve
in ways that cannot be precisely predetermined.  Even at this juncture, however, there is a clear
sense that arms production is being reconstituted around a radically new industrial paradigm
involving the use of computer-driven flexible machine tools, ‘lean production’ processes, and
rapidly re-configurable ‘virtual enterprises’ to undertake low-rate/low-volume production of
increasingly ‘knowledge-intensive’ high-technology weapons.  As it evolves and diffuses through
the US armaments industry, this new paradigm is profoundly transforming the nature and logic of
armaments production.  Indeed, so profound are these changes that the transition to agile arms
production can be said to constitute nothing less than a ‘quiet revolution’, marking the end of one
era in America’s military-industrial history and the beginning of another.
This paper seeks to illuminate this process of military-industrial transformation.  It argues that two
powerful motive forces can be identified behind this phenomenon.  The first is practical, deriving
from both the need to field the kind of increasingly knowledge-intensive weapons deemed necessary
to American military superiority in the late twentieth century and the need to contain costs.  The
second is discursive, having to do with the influence that the ideals of ‘precision warfare’ and
‘postfordist production’ have gained over the collective imagination of America’s managerial,
military and military-industrial elites.  At one level, the effects of these two forces are difficult to
disentangle as the prevailing understanding of the nature of the ‘material’ requirement for victory
in war is powerfully shaped by an ideal that emphasises the importance of ‘precision’.  Indeed, it
is important to recognise that neither material nor discursive forces have absolute primacy in the
shaping of contemporary US military-industrial policy; both are playing a prominent role in
reshaping patterns of military (product and process) innovation.  Nevertheless, it is crucial to our
understanding of the development and diffusion of the agile manufacturing paradigm to develop
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some sense of the way in which these forces are acting and interacting to transform arms production
during the contemporary period.  Thus, this paper attempts to illuminate this process of military-
industrial transition by tracing the diffusion of ‘agile’ production techniques through the crucially
important US military aerospace industry.  Recognising that the terrain explored is far too complex
to be mapped properly within the limits of this paper, my goal is not to provide a comprehensive
account of the evolution of the American military aerospace industry during the current era.  Rather,
it is to chart the way in which a key sub-sector of the arms industry is experiencing the crossing of
America’s third military-industrial divide.  Although it would be preferable to discuss the motive
forces driving this transition separately, the way in which these forces interact with one another
means that an integrated sketch is all that is possible.
This paper proceeds in three parts.  In the first section, I discuss the effects of the ‘military-technical
revolution’ on the military-industrial environment in the United States.  I then examine the state’s
response to this phenomenon, focusing on both the US government’s articulation of a new vision
of arms production – ‘agile manufacturing’ – and on its efforts to encourage the realisation of this
new vision through a number of key policy initiatives.  The paper concludes with some general
observations regarding the nature of the US arms industry’s transition to agile manufacturing.
The Triggering Effects of the ‘Military-Technical Revolution’
Although the conventional wisdom states that military industrial restructuring is driven primarily
by the contraction in the global arms market associated with the end of the Cold War, in the late
twentieth century there are other forces at work reshaping the arms industry. One of these is the so-
called ‘military-technical revolution’ (MTR) that is currently transforming the ideas, instruments
and institutions of warfare in the United States.2  At the battlefield or war-fighting level, the MTR
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involves the use of microelectronics, precision munitions, stealth technology, near real-time sensing
capabilities, and ever more advanced C3I to generate quantum increases in ‘visibility’ (the ability
to grasp the battlefield), ‘lethality’ (the ability to destroy or incapacitate the enemy on the
battlefield), ‘flexibility’ (the ability to respond to developments on the battlefield) and
‘concealability’ (the ability to prevent an enemy from observing one’s forces on the battlefield).  In
one sense, of course, this revolution can be interpreted as the natural outcome of a process that began
during the Second World War.  This is so not only because technology has increasingly dominated
weapons’ development and production throughout the entire period since 1945, but because, as Mary
Kaldor argues, technological innovation during this era was largely a matter of exaggerating and
improving the performance characteristics of the weapons systems that had proven decisive during
the War.3  But there is something clearly revolutionary about recent changes in military technology
and technique.  At a very general level, this is probably due to the fact that, as Soviet military
theorists predicted in the 1970s, incremental changes in the means and methods of combat have
exerted a progressively more profound effect on the character of warfare, and are now culminating
in a qualitative transformation in the nature of warfighting.4  On another level, however, the
emerging mode of warfare is increasingly viewed as revolutionary because military technologies are
more and more frequently breaking out of technological trajectories established during the Second
World War as the search for radically new combinations of generic technologies becomes a primary
determinant of the structure of military demand.  Whatever the case, there is now a general
consensus that the mode of warfare has evolved beyond Industrialised Total Warfare, and that the
‘Military After Next’ will be organised around instruments, ideas and institutions radically different
from those that dominated the Second World War.5
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The Dynamics of Military Technology in the Late Modern Era
During the era of Industrialised Total Warfare, the means of destruction were essentially electro-
mechanical in nature, reflecting the technological ‘state-of-the-art’ during the First and Second
Industrial Revolutions.  The instruments of warfare included enabling technologies such as steel,
steam, and the internal combustion engine, as well as dedicated military technologies such as rifles,
artillery and tanks.  With the application of the technologies of the Third Industrial Revolution to
military purposes, however, these instruments of warfare are increasingly being supplemented (and
supplanted) by revolutionary advances in electronics, artificial intelligence and computing, C3I
systems, and advanced materials.  As in the civil sector, these technologies are exerting truly
revolutionary effects.  Indeed, they have already begun to transform the battlefield by vastly
increasing single-shot kill ratios, providing near real-time command and control, and creating an
ever more transparent ‘battlespace’.6  As these knowledge-intensive military technologies continue
to evolve, some argue that, in the not too distant future, the fundamental technical bases of warfare
will be transformed, and that ‘aircraft carriers, tanks, fighters and bombers will cease to have a
primary role in the postmodern theatre of war’.7  In this scenario, the battlefield of the twenty-first
century will be dominated, not by massed troops and armour, but by:
networks of intelligent mines and unpiloted drones that can perform reconnaissance
and launch or plant weapons.  Highly dispersed special forces may scout for targets
and evaluate battle damage.  Remotely fired missiles may become the main
instruments for destroying enemy targets.8
For the moment, of course, such scenarios remain the stuff of futuristic treatises;9 warfare today
continues to be dominated by ‘baroque’ versions of the military technologies that achieved
preeminence during the Second World War.  Indeed, many of today’s most advanced weapons
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systems are the culmination of a long process of more or less linear ‘trend innovation’, which Kaldor
describes as ‘perpetual improvements to weapons that fall within established traditions of the armed
services and the armourers’.10  But the constant, continuing press of technological innovation is
increasingly yielding a plethora of military technologies that ‘break out’ of existing technological
trajectories, either as a result of the development of radically new technologies or as previously
discrete generic technologies are dynamically recombined in novel ways.
Simply stated, then, the onset of the so-called ‘military-technical revolution’ has given rise to a new
‘great desideratum’ in American military circles: ‘knowledge-intensive’ weaponry.  This ideal has
come to exercise enormous influence within the American military, generating a dynamic of
‘perpetual innovation’ that is increasingly forcing arms producers to seek an enhanced capacity to
upgrade existing weapons systems, to develop radically new weapons technologies (by combining
generic technologies in new and innovative ways), and to reduce ‘lab-to-field’ cycles so that new
technologies are not obsolete before they are deployed.  It is also accelerating the pace of
technological innovation.  Military innovation, of course, has always been an important element of
interstate rivalry, and the phenomenon of perpetual innovation can be traced back at least to the
‘invention of invention’ in the nineteenth century.11  What distinguishes both the emerging mode of
warfare and its military-industrial correlates is that as we approach the twenty-first century the
capacity to develop, produce and field ever more innovative and ‘knowledge-intensive’ weaponry
is becoming the primary determinant of military power and victory in war.  This differs from the
preceding era, during which the capacity for technological innovation, while important, was less
decisive than the capacity for social and economic mobilisation.
The Effects of the MTR on the Military-Industrial Environment
After the Second World War, market conditions in the civil sector were such that manufacturers
were able to organise production around specialised machine tools and rigid and mechanically-
guided production lines employing relatively unskilled labour.  This system was sustained by an
interlocking framework of state, market and institutional control systems that stabilised and
standardised demand, unleashing the full productive potential of the fordist paradigm.  This fusion
of the fordist production paradigm with an appropriate regulatory framework generated
unprecedented economic growth during the post-War era.  Indeed, so great was the economic
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expansion initiated by this growth model that the period is often referred to as the ‘golden age of
capitalism’.12
In the arms sector, on the other hand, conditions could scarcely have been more different.  Where
commercial firms serviced a market that encouraged the standardisation of products and parts, the
pursuit of economies of scale, the mechanisation of the manufacturing process, and the lowering of
product prices, arms manufacturers had to produce for a monopsonist state that demanded relatively
small numbers of specialised, increasingly ‘baroque’, performance-maximising weapons.13  Cold
War rivalry and the system of perpetual military innovation it fostered worked against the
implementation of commercial-style fordism in several ways.  First, it blocked the kind of
standardisation of demand that allowed the widespread use of specialised production machinery in
the civil sector.  The emphasis on ‘technological superiority’ meant that designs had to be updated
and incorporate the latest technological advances.  This worked against the kind of dedicated
mechanisation increasingly common in the commercial sector.  Second, perpetual innovation and
the pursuit of ‘technological superiority’ worked against product simplification, giving rise to
increasingly complex (baroque) technologies that were not particularly amenable to fordist
production practices.  Finally, in the aftermath of World War Two, levels of demand dropped
dramatically, and never again reached levels that could be called ‘mass’.  While the military often
procured large quantities of specific types of weapons, demand never reached the ‘mass’ proportions
that were common in the civil sector.14  This precluded making the kinds of investment in advanced,
dedicated machinery that had enabled commercial firms to continually increase productivity through
the 1960s.  It also encouraged the development and diffusion of flexible manufacturing systems, as
well as an increased dependence on skilled labour.15  As the Cold War progressed and the tendency
toward baroque technology intensified, these differences in the mode of regulation were
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exacerbated, widening the breach between commercial and military variants of fordism, though
never severing the material and discursive links connecting them.16
Against this backdrop, the onset of the MTR triggered the terminal decline of military-fordism.  By
the late 1970s, the disjuncture between patterns of military demand and the logic of the prevailing
arms production paradigm had begun to manifest itself as a growing inability to produce affordable
high-technology weapons systems.17  At first, these tensions between the military-fordist production
paradigm and the technical demand of the prevailing mode of warfare had been problematic, but
manageable.  During the late 1980s, the quantum leap in the knowledge-intensity and technological
density of warfare associated with the military-technical revolution, coupled with the reduction in
military spending associated with the end of the Cold War, intensified these tensions to the point
where they reached crisis proportions.  Indeed, even before the end of the Cold War it was clear to
many in both industry and government that change in the technical bases of warfare, coupled with
the transformation of the global security environment, had signalled the terminal decline of the
existing arms production paradigm.18
From the point of view of the state, the exhaustion of the military-fordist paradigm manifested itself
first and foremost in terms of a radical inability of US arms producers to undertake the kind of low-
rate/low-volume production of technologically-dense goods required by knowledge-intensive
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warfare.  Under military-fordism, there was a clear correlation between rate/volume of production
and unit costs: the more units produced, and the more rapidly they were manufactured, the lower
were individual unit prices.  Conversely, shorter production runs tended to result in higher unit
prices as the cost of development and tooling was amortised over fewer units of output.  This was
not terribly problematic during World War Two, when levels of demand were roughly comparable
to those prevailing in the commercial marketplace.  Following the war, however, sharp reductions
in the levels of absolute demand, coupled with the rising technological-density and complexity of
weaponry, began to drive costs upward.  Almost invariably, this meant that with each successive
generation of weapons fewer and fewer units could be purchased.19  As a result, unit prices were
driven up still further, setting off the escalatory spiral that subsequently came to be known as
‘structural disarmament’.  Primarily as a result of the MTR, by the late 1980s this situation had
become much worse, and it was generally acknowledged in US military-industrial circles that the
tendency toward structural disarmament, which was rooted in the very nature of military-fordism,
had reached crisis proportions.20
The onset of the MTR, then, created an unbridgeable gap between the nature of military demand on
the one hand and the logic and best-practices of military-fordism on the other.  This initiated a crisis
in US military-industrial circles as government fears of structural disarmament converged with
industry fears of declining profits and bankruptcy to initiate a period of profound intellectual ferment
and practical experimentation related to arms manufacturing.  Out of this process, a new set of
military-industrial desiderata emerged during the late 1980s and early 1990, key elements of which
include:
C cost-efficient low-rate/low-volume production: A key part of the military’s vision of the
arms industry of the future is a capacity to produce limited numbers of knowledge-intensive
weaponry at affordable costs (with costs defined not only in terms of initial purchase prices,
but overall life-cycle expenses as well).
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C a capacity for rapid technology realisation and insertion: As the MTR accelerates, the arms
industry of the future must be able to develop and insert advanced technologies rapidly.  This
involves not simply developing and producing new platforms in a timely fashion, but also
a capacity for quickly inserting leading-edge subsystems into ongoing production
programmes.
C a capacity for rapid prototyping: In a military-technical environment where not every new
technology can be put into quantity production, technology-demonstrators, technology
integration demonstrators, production retrofit demonstrators, and operational prototypes will
play an increasingly important role in US acquisition strategy.  In such an environment, the
capacity to rapidly and cost-efficiently develop and produce prototypes will be crucially
important to maintaining a technological edge.21
C a capacity to draw on the broader civil technology and industrial base: As the commercial
sector has taken the lead in technological dynamism, there has been a recognition that
continued American military-technical superiority requires the creation of a unified national
technology and industrial base.22
For arms firms, then, the military-technical revolution and the associated quantum leap in the
knowledge-intensity of weaponry has initiated a clear rupture with the industrial best-practices of
the post-War era.  Whereas during the Cold War the tensions between military demand and the logic
of the arms production paradigm were manageable (if only at great expense), since the onset of the
MTR they have reached crisis proportions.  This has generated pressures to adapt manufacturing
processes, business practices and intra- and inter-firm relations in order to enhance flexibility and
innovative capacity, the goal being affordable low-rate/low-volume production of knowledge-
intensive weaponry.  In recent years, this process has culminated in the adoption by arms producers
of those ‘postfordist’ manufacturing practices that are widely perceived to underpin the
technological vitality of the global electronics and automobile industries.23
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The Pentagon and the Evolution of ‘Agile Manufacturing’
Pressured by the demands of an accelerating military-technical revolution to restructure and
modernize, and inspired by the successful application of ‘postfordist’ production techniques in the
US automotive and electronics sectors,24 over the last decade or so American arms producers have
simultaneously undertaken innovations in product technologies, development and manufacturing
processes, and corporate structure.  As a result, the (essentially fordist) production paradigm around
which US arms manufacturing has been organized since the Second World War has entered into a
period of terminal decline, and the defining features of a new arms production paradigm are now
becoming visible across the American military-industrial landscape.  Conditioned to a significant
degree by the example of the Japanese and American automobile industries, this emerging paradigm
is based on four principles.  The first is the pursuit of flexibility, which involves efforts to adopt new
technologies and techniques in order to de-couple rate and volume of production from unit cost.  The
second is the pursuit of accelerated technological innovation through the adoption of a variety of
practices intended to shorten design-to-field times and encourage the dynamic re-combination of
previously discrete technologies in new and innovative ways.  The third organizing principle is the
pursuit of ‘leanness’ through the relentless elimination of waste and inefficiency at every stage of
the production cycle.  The final principle is ‘agility’, defined as the ability to create electronically-
integrated virtual enterprises (comprising civil and military firms) quickly and painlessly to respond
effectively to constantly evolving demand patterns.  This new paradigm can be conceptualized as
agile manufacturing – a term that has been advanced in various military-industrial circles to refer
to the adaptation of postfordist production techniques to the military-industrial environment of the
late twentieth century.25  Since the early 1990s, agile manufacturing has become the paradigmatic
vision of what the future arms industry should look like, and has thus played a crucial role in the
contemporary restructuring of the US defence industrial base.
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This section also makes the argument that while the pursuit of perpetual innovation has become the
defining characteristic of the contemporary arms industry, affordability has become an important
secondary consideration.  During the military-fordist era, production engineers and industrial
managers never managed to sever the connection between rate/volume of production and unit cost,
despite innovations such as N/C machine tools and other flexibility enhancing innovations.  As a
result, as the volume of military orders has declined (due to the passing of Industrialised Total
Warfare, the decline of military-keynesianism and the end of the Cold War), and as the technological
density of weaponry has increased, by the late 1970s unit costs were rising so fast that many feared
the United States was on course toward structural disarmament.  Faced with this prospect, during
the 1980s state and industrial officials began searching for new ways of manufacturing arms.  At
first, they turned their attention toward the Japanese model of production, which was universally
regarded as having solved many of the problems facing the US arms industry.26  Later, they began
to look at the ‘lean manufacturing’ model that was widely perceived to have reversed the sagging
fortunes of America’s automotive firms.  While the new vision of arms production that emerged out
of this period of intellectual ferment ultimately transcended the (initially civilian) lean production
paradigm, it is clear that this latest cluster of ‘modern methods’ has exercised a powerful
conditioning influence on the contemporary military-industrial restructuring process.
The US Government and the Evolution of Agile Arms Production
The complex edifice of promotion and support underpinning the diffusion of postfordist production
techniques through the arms industry began taking shape in the early 1990s with the launching of
the Lean Aircraft Initiative (LAI).27  The LAI’s primary mandate was (and is) to encourage military
aerospace companies to begin adopting the postfordist lean production techniques that are widely
perceived to have revived America’s automotive industry during the 1980s.  The goal underpinning
this initiative has been twofold: to create the capacity for low-volume/low-rate production of
military products at reasonable prices; and to shorten weapons system development time and
increase the pace at which technological improvements can be incorporated into new systems.  The
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initiative has its roots in the realization in military-industrial circles that America’s ability to develop
and incorporate advanced, and increasingly knowledge-intensive, technologies at affordable prices
required a fundamental change in the nature of the arms production system.
The LAI began in earnest in 1992 when the US Air Force’s Aeronautical Systems Center (AF/ASC)
requested that Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) conduct an initial ‘quick-look’
evaluation of the applicability of lean production practices in the military aircraft industry.  MIT,
which had earlier identified such postfordist practices as the single most important factor behind the
Japanese automobile industry’s competitive edge over its American counterpart, conducted an initial
assessment of the military aerospace industry, and concluded that the application of lean
manufacturing techniques to the manufacture of military aircraft could be expected to result in a
number of benefits, including:
C fifty percent reductions in factory labour, factory space and engineering effort;
C ninety percent reductions in in-process inventory;
C sixty-six percent reductions in the number of defects;
C eighty-seven percent reductions in suppliers and subcontractors; and
C fifty to sixty-six percent reductions in aircraft development times.
The assessment also concluded that adopting lean production techniques would improve the ‘ability
of US industry to rapidly develop prototypes and implement product improvements quickly in
response to changes in threat and need’.28
As a result of this positive initial evaluation, in August 1993 the AF/ASC launched a more
comprehensive three-year programme intended to identify and study lean production practices and
to promote their diffusion through the military aerospace industry.  Under this initiative, the US Air
Force’s Wright Labs began collaborating with about twenty military aerospace firms (distributed
across the three main sub-sectors: airframes, avionics and propulsion) to build and extend the lean
production paradigm through an organized programme of research, information-sharing, and pilot
projects.29  The LAI is organized under the auspices of MIT’s Center for Technology, Policy and
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Pratt & Whitney, Rockwell North American Aircraft, Sundstrand, Texas Instruments, Textron Defense
Systems, TRW, and Westinghouse Electronic Systems Group.
     30Mark Hewish and Pamela Pohling-Brown, ‘Making Change a Positive Force: Revolution in US Aircraft
Factories’, International Defence Review 28:4 (1 April 1995), p. 30.
     31Stanley I. Weiss, Earll M. Murman and Daniel Roos, ‘The Air Force and Industry Think Lean’,
Aerospace America (May 1996), p. 2/9.
     32Hewish and Pohling-Brown, ‘Making Change a Positive Force: Revolution in US Aircraft Factories’,
p. 31.
Industrial Development (CTPID), which acts as a research ‘hub’ and clearing house.  Funding is
provided by both the government (US $950,000 per year) and the participating firms (US $75,000
per year per firm).  ‘The whole effort is overseen by an advisory board made up of senior officials
from the aerospace industry, government and national labour unions’.30
During its initial stages, the LAI focused on evaluating the degree to which lean production practices
had diffused through the US military aerospace industry.  Subsequently and more recently, however,
it has ‘sought to identify existing high-performance practices, within and outside the aerospace
community, emphasizing those that can bring major reductions in both cost and cycle time’.31  To
this end, the project has used integrated research teams (involving government, industry and labour)
to conduct surveys and case studies of relevant industrial organisations.  In its final year, the LAI
is concentrating on developing a ‘Lean Enterprise Model’ (LEM) to aid in the implementation of
postfordist production practices throughout the US military aerospace industry.
Although the project will not be completed until late 1996, several government initiatives have
already resulted from LAI research.  For example, the USAF has actively encouraged lean
manufacturing techniques for the F-22 fighter, JDAM (Join Direct Attack Munition), and C-17
transport aircraft programmes.  It has also launched two dedicated pathfinder projects, one in
connection with the JAST next-generation Air Force/Navy strike aircraft programme (involving
seven demonstration projects to pilot the introduction of lean manufacturing techniques), and the
other a project related to postfordist ‘modular factories’.32
A second, and somewhat more comprehensive initiative for the promotion of postfordist techniques
was also launched in 1991 when the US Department of Defense sponsored a study by an industry-led
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group to investigate the future of arms production.33  This study, conducted at Lehigh University’s
Iacocca Institute, coined the term ‘agile manufacturing’ to describe its vision of America’s military-
industrial future.  As described in the study report 21st Century Manufacturing Enterprise
Strategy,34 agile manufacturing is a new postfordist production paradigm that is intended to enable
the arms industry ‘to thrive in an environment of continuous and unanticipated change’.35  Achieving
such agility in arms manufacturing requires integrating computer-driven production technologies
with the skill base of a knowledgeable workforce using postfordist management structures.  It
includes elements of both ‘flexible’ and ‘lean’ postfordist manufacturing techniques, but it is not
synonymous with these approaches.  Simply stated, whereas flexible production focuses on process
adaptability, and lean production aims at reducing cost and shortening design-to-field times through
the use of advanced techniques and technologies, agile production is intended to enhance technology
development through the use of rapidly reconfigurable, computer-networked cooperative ventures
capable of meeting the changing requirements of knowledge-intensive warfare.  In other words, agile
manufacturing encompasses the basic postfordist objectives of severing volume/rate of production
and cost, reducing waste, and shortening design-to-field cycles, but also emphasizes the rapid
creation of ‘virtual enterprise’ – groups of vertically and/or horizontally linked companies that come
together via computer networks to fill a specific demand.  It is based on the recognition that while
programmable automated machine tools and flexible manufacturing techniques are important
elements of the new industrial paradigm, they are only part of the picture.  True agility requires that
the ‘entire supply chain . . .  be engineered and managed so that manufacturers can work
concurrently with their strategic partners, suppliers and customers to reduce costs and improve
product design and performance’.36  Whereas in the automotive industry the tendency has been to
organize the supplier chain around semi-permanent ‘extended enterprise’ (supplier-assembler
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partnerships lasting 20+ years), in the arms industry the vision that has emerged emphasizes the
creation of short-term horizontal and vertical teaming arrangements via computer networks.37
A key element of the agile manufacturing vision is the creation of an integrated national technology
and industrial base (NTIB) comprising agile commercial and military firms, linked by computer
networks, that can be assembled quickly to form a virtual enterprise capable of rapid and cost-
efficient product realisation.38  As arms production has become less and less vertically-integrated,39
and as production has come to be based on complex ‘webs’ of suppliers,40 assemblers and strategic
partners, military-industrial planners and industry executives have come to recognize that there are
considerable benefits to including both commercial and military firms in the pool of potential project
participants.  Although significant cost-savings may derive from including commercial firms in the
potential supplier chain (the commercial supplier of a particular technology may be the most cost-
efficient), the real military benefit of an integrated NTIB lies in the enhanced access to leading-edge
technology that this would afford arms producers.  An additional benefit, and one not to be
underestimated, would be an expansion of the military supplier base.  Over the past few decades,
the regulatory burdens associated with defence contracting have driven many of the crucial sub-tier
suppliers (usually small- and medium-sized enterprises) out of the arms industry.41  This has been
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a source of concern in military-industrial circles, not only because it threatens the viability and
‘surge capacity’ of the US arms industry, but because it increases US dependence on foreign sources
as well.42  Creating an integrated NTIB comprising agile firms capable of servicing commercial and
military markets with equal facility would assure the continued existence of a robust arms industry
at the level of prime contractors, sub-contractors and suppliers.
Inspired by this vision, the US government has recently begun to dismantle many of the regulatory
barriers to civil-military integration.  There is a growing realisation, however, that a truly integrated
NTIB will require more than simply removing the regulatory barriers dividing the CTIB and DTIB.
While this is an important precondition for integration, the development of an intrinsically ‘dual-use’
technology and industrial base will require the recomposition of the entire US technology and
industrial base into agile firms capable of rapidly forming virtual enterprises in response to
constantly evolving commercial and military demand patterns.  In essence, the goal is to transcend
the distinction between commercial and military firms by creating a single, generic category of
industrial enterprise that can be readily incorporated into an industrial web producing either
commercial or military goods.43
Thus, in a very real sense the agile manufacturing vision can be said to represent a military-inspired
derivative of the postfordist production methods.  It is clearly rooted in the basic logic of postfordist
production, emphasising flexibility, quality and responsiveness.  But it goes beyond this paradigm
to include a new vision of inter-firm relations, one based on the rapid creation and dissolution of
virtual enterprises comprising generic firms (i.e., firms that are neither civil nor military in the
traditional sense) that can service the commercial or defence markets with equal ease.  While
deriving from the military-industrial desiderata generated by the military-technical revolution, this
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vision is not restricted to the arms industry; for, if the agile vision is to be realized, civil industry
also has to be transformed.  Thus, the emergence of this new vision of production has had an
important ‘knock-on’ effect: it has triggered a new phase in the restructuring of the commercial
technology and industrial base.  Increasingly, commercial industry sees agile manufacturing as its
hope for future competitiveness in a world of fast-paced technical change and intensified global
competition.44
Since the publication of 21st Manufacturing Enterprise Strategy, the vision of agile arms production
developed at the Iaccoca Institute has come to enjoy great currency in both government and industry
circles.  Building on this vision, the US government has initiated a number of research programmes
aimed at infusing an agile manufacturing capability into the defence industrial base.  Inter alia, these
include the Manufacturing Automation and Design Environment (MADE) programme, the
Affordable Multi-Missile Manufacturing (AM3) programme, the Technologies Enabling Agile
Manufacturing (TEAM) programme, and the Electronic Commerce Resource Center (ECRC)
programme.  The most important of these have been implemented under the auspices of the joint
Advanced Research Projects Agency/National Science Foundation (ARPA/NSF) Agile
Manufacturing Initiative (AMI).  Initiated in 1993, the AMI’s mandate is to ‘develop, demonstrate
and evaluate the advanced design, manufacturing and business transaction processes described in
the 21st Century Manufacturing Enterprise Strategy report’,45 thus encouraging and facilitating the
implementation of agile manufacturing through the arms industry and the broader technology and
industrial base upon which the arms industry relies.
The Agile Manufacturing Initiative operates through a series of working groups, fora and research
institutes focusing on particular topics.  These act as catalysts for change in the arms industry by
providing greater definition of the vision of agile manufacturing, identifying impediments to the
diffusion of the emerging paradigm, and validating/demonstrating the effectiveness of particular
techniques.  The AMI has so far established six subsidiary projects:
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C The Agility Forum (formerly the Agile Manufacturing Enterprise Forum): This is an industry
forum which is responsible for developing and refining the overall vision of agile
manufacturing first articulated in the Iacocca Institute study.  Its responsibilities include
defining agile business practices, identifying technology needs, recommending pilot
programmes and demonstrations, and generally promoting industry awareness and training
activities.  ‘In addition to its outreach and dissemination activities, the Forum is committed
to producing an evolving, integrated, system-level model of agility out of knowledge being
generated by more than 30 government- and industry-funded research, development and
pilot projects as well as by the Forum’s own programs and activities; and it is committed to
producing agile business practice ‘toolkits’ that companies can use to deploy agility in their
organization and assess its impact’.46
C Agile Manufacturing Research Institutes (AMRIs): The purpose of the AMRI ‘is to develop
an understanding of agile manufacturing enterprise and system performance based on
quantitative data; to structure a program of research to meet industry-defined needs; and to
move emerging technology which has a potential for impacting agile manufacturing into the
next stage of functional prototyping or proof-of-concept test beds’.47  Several AMRIs have
been established, including the Aerospace Agile Manufacturing Research Center, the
Machine Tool Agile Manufacturing Research Institute, and the Electronics Agile
Manufacturing Research Institute.
C Agile Manufacturing Network Projects: The purpose of this programme is to develop a
prototype of the national information infrastructure necessary to support a distributed
technology and industrial base, and to facilitate electronic commerce and electronic data
interchange.  Existing projects include the Advanced Collaborative Open Resource Network
(ACORN), the Agile Manufacturing Information Infrastructure, the CAMnet Prototype
projects and the PartNet project.
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C Agile Business Practice Projects: These projects are intended to test, validate and
demonstrate innovative business practices that focus on enabling the rapid formation and
dissolution of virtual enterprises.  The projects deal with issues such as labour organisation,
decision support, and virtual enterprise management.  Ongoing projects include the Agile
Web Pilot Program, the Labor Infrastructure for Agile High Performance Transformations
project, the Supply Chain IPPD Pilot Project, and the Strategic Planning and Operating
Tools for Agile Enterprise project.
C Enabling Technology Development and Demonstration Projects: The purpose of this
programme is to facilitate the development and demonstrate the utility of a range of
technologies necessary to agile manufacturing.  Projects include the Agile Manufacturing
Decision Support Systems project, the Decision Support System for the Management of
Agile Supply Chains, and the Virtual Enterprise Engineering Environment project.
C Agile Manufacturing Pilot and Pathfinder Demonstration Projects: These projects are
intended to demonstrate the applicability and utility of agile manufacturing techniques and
enabling technologies.  ‘The primary focus is on networked interfaces with suppliers and
customers for product development and electronic commerce, and on business methods for
virtual companies’.48  Agile Manufacturing Pilot Projects include the Agile Infrastructure for
Manufacturing Systems (AIMS) project; Agile Manufacturing Pathfinder Projects include
the MIT/Lehigh Fast and Flexible Communication in the Aerospace Industry project.49
In addition to launching the LAI, AMI and other industrial transformation initiatives, the US
government has taken a number of steps to remove the regulatory impediments to agile production
and the creation of a unified national technology and industrial base.  Until quite recently, of course,
many elements of the military acquisition process (even as reformed during the 1980s) worked
against the diffusion of postfordist production techniques.  The Competition in Contracting Act
(CICA), for example, has had a powerful dampening effect on process innovation and the ability of
arms producers to adapt their organizational structures to the changing commercial environment.
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Initially put in place in 1984, the CICA is a Federal statute which requires ‘full and open
competition’ in all US government procurement programmes.  While conceived as a means of
creating competitive market conditions (and thus reducing prices) in previously non-competitive
markets, CICA has in many ways served to slow the proliferation of postfordist techniques which
might substantially improve efficiency and productivity in the defence sector. In particular, the
requirement that contracts for components and subsystems be tendered on a competitive basis means
that the development of the type of long-term relationships at the heart of many new corporate
governance structures (particularly solar complexes) is significantly inhibited.  In turn, this limits
the extent to which concurrent engineering, just-in-time manufacturing and TQM (all of which are
at least partly dependent on these new organisational structures) can be implemented.
Dual\second sourcing practices involving transfers of proprietary technologies, while also rooted
in an entirely reasonable impulse to control defence costs, have had similar effects on the
proliferation of postfordist manufacturing techniques.50  In such a situation developers not only run
the risk of not being awarded the production contract (which they may be counting on to subsidize
development), but of having to transfer technical data and design/development information to
competitors.  As a result, they are necessarily discouraged from incorporating proprietary production
technologies or management techniques in their design proposals.
Other regulatory impediments include budget instability, which makes it difficult to employ efficient
production planning and control techniques; the nature of military contracts, which stipulate that
only approved production processes can be used; and the criminalisation of non-compliance, which
further reduces flexibility, responsiveness and risk-taking by forcing managers to fulfil strictly
regulatory requirements.51
Beyond these direct impediments to the diffusion of postfordist production practices, the regulatory
framework governing arms procurement has also impeded the realisation of the agile manufacturing
22 Latham — Postfordism in the US Arms Industry
     52See, for example, US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Assessing the Potential for Civil-
Military Integration: Technologies, Processes and Practices, OTA-ISS-611 (Washington, DC: USGPO,
1994); Defense Science Board, Use of Commercial Components in Military Equipment (Washington, DC:
USGPO, 1989); US Congress, Streamlining Defense Acquisition Laws: Report of the Acquisition Law
Advisory Panel to the United States Congress, January 1993; US Department of Defense, Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense
Acquisition Reform (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1993); Debra van Opstal, Integrating Civilian and Military
Technologies: An Industry Survey (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993);
and Jeff Bingaman, Jacques Gansler, and Robert Kupperman, Integrating Commercial and Military
Technologies for National Strength (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1991).
     53Jacques Gansler, ‘The Future of the Defence Firm: Integrating Civil and Military Technologies, in
Andrew Latham and Nick Hooper (eds.), The Future of the Defence Firm: New Challenges, New Directions
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), p. 93.
     54For a countervailing view see Maryellen R. Kelley and Todd A. Watkins, ‘In from the Cold: Prospects
for Conversion of the Defense Industrial Base’, Science, 268 (28 April 1995); and idem., ‘The Myth of the
Specialized military Contractor’, Technology Review (April 1995).
     55See especially Jeff Bingaman, et al., Integrating Commercial and Military Technologies for National
Strength, Chapter 1.
vision in that it effectively segregated the defence technology and industrial base from its
commercial counterpart, thus blocking the evolution of the kind of unified NTIB required for agile
arms production.  The regulatory sources of segregation have been well documented in previous
studies and need only be discussed briefly here.52  Suffice it to say that during the Cold War factors
such as unique accounting requirements, military specifications and standards, state control of
technical data rights, and byzantine public contracting procedures meant that, ‘in many companies,
defence products are designed, developed, produced and supported in isolated plants or independent
division; and many other companies either maintain separate research facilities for defence and
commercial work or simply refuse to accept DoD research contracts’.53  This led to the evolution of
two discrete and isolated technology and industrial bases in the US: one exclusively commercial,
the other primarily military.54  While this may have made sense even as recently as 15 years ago –
when ‘DOD set a standard of technological performance that few commercial firms could match’
– in makes little sense today, when ‘the pace of innovation and the standard of performance are set
in the commercial sector in response to an intensely competitive international business
environment’.55
Viewed against this backdrop, it is clear that the American government’s ability to realize its vision
of an agile arms industry is largely dependent on its ability to eliminate or reduce the barriers
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separating the commercial and defence technology and industrial bases; for only if these barriers are
lowered will it be possible to create the kind of unified technology and industrial base that state and
industry officials perceive as being necessary to the future of American arms production.  To date,
the government has taken a number of steps in the direction of creating such a regulatory framework.
Two of these stand out as being particularly important.56  The first was the passing of the 1994
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) which specifically addressed the purchase of
commercial items and services, provided a clearer definition of commercial items and services,
eliminated the requirement for cost and pricing data on commercial items, and made it more difficult
for the government to acquire rights in technical data for items developed with private funds.57
The second significant initiative in this regard involved a significant reduction in the use of military
specifications and standards (milspecs) in the defence acquisition process.  Milspecs, as a number
of government and academic reports have concluded,58 have long constituted one of the key
impediments to the integration of the commercial and defense technology and industrial bases in that
they deter many successful commercial firms from undertaking military business.  Thus, any
movement toward lowering the barriers between the commercial and military technology and
industrial bases will require a prior reduction in the use of milspecs.59  It will also involve
‘fundamentally altering the incentive structure to promote greater use of commercial goods’.60
In June 1994, Secretary of Defense William Perry took a decisive step in this direction when he
circulated a memorandum directing the Department of Defense to implement changes in the use of
military specifications and standards.61  This memorandum directed military procurement executives
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‘to use performance and commercial specifications and standards instead of military specification
and standards, unless no practical alternative exists to meet the user’s needs’.62  To be certain, even
before 1994, DoD had begun the process of shifting to commercial standards, and by 1993 ‘had
increased the number of adopted non-governmental (i.e., commercial standards from 3,279 to 5,617
[a 51 percent increase])’.63  Until the Secretary issued his 1994 memorandum, however, progress had
been slow and piecemeal, impeded by a bureaucratic infrastructure not convinced that senior
officials were serious about altering the procurement environment so profoundly.  Since 1994,
however, all this has changed.  The Secretary’s memorandum has signalled the commitment of
senior levels of DoD to procurement reform and the shift to commercial standards.  Now, there is
a clear presumption that commercial standards will be used except in carefully delimited
circumstances.  While the process of integrating the civil and military specifications and standards
around the commercial norm is far from complete, it is clear that the process is well underway.64
While they mark the beginning of a transformation of the regulatory framework governing arms
production, these regulatory and acquisition reform initiatives have thus far failed to create the type
of unified technology and industrial base essential to the realisation of agile manufacturing.  Indeed,
as one OTA report put it, ‘in the face of persistent obstacles to commercial purchasing, these
executive and legislative branch efforts have had only marginal success in increasing [commercial-
military integration]’ . . .   The process of integration is in its infancy, however, and while the final
outcome is difficult to predict precisely, it is clear that the first tentative steps have been taken
toward restructuring the regulatory framework in order to realize the state’s vision of agile
manufacturing.
Conclusions
Latham — Postfordism in the US Arms Industry 25
     65Kenney and Florida, Beyond Mass Production, p. 16.
Many of the findings reported in this paper concerning the diffusion of postfordist production
technologies and techniques should be regarded as preliminary and, therefore, more indicative of
evolutionary tendencies rather than a completed transformation.  Nevertheless, based on this broad
survey of military-industrial restructuring, four general observations can be made concerning the
transition to agile manufacturing.  First, the process of experimentation and bricolage that
characterizes the current stage of the transformation of arms production is being driven by the need
to develop the means to sustain high-quality/low-cost production under conditions of rapidly
changing patterns of military demand.  The problems experienced by US arms producers in the
1970s and 1980s derived not from a shortage of innovative capacity, but from tendentially rising
costs that posed a serious threat to their long-term commercial viability.  These production problems
arose in part from a fundamental tension between the nature of military-fordism (which created an
inversely proportional relationship between rate/volume of production and unit costs) and the
emergent military-technical revolution (which involved a shift away from the mass production of
simple weapons to an emphasis on smaller numbers of increasingly ‘baroque’ armaments).
Beginning in the 1990s, American arms producers began to realize that if they were to maintain their
economic viability and technological competitiveness in the context of a changing regulatory
framework, they would have to find ways of severing the military-fordist connection between
volume and cost, thus achieving affordable low-rate production.
But if the pursuit of affordability is clearly a powerful motive in the current restructuring of arms
production, the adoption of agile manufacturing techniques is also being driven by a desire to
maintain and enhance the technological vitality of the arms industry.  Under conditions of ‘perpetual
innovation’, extending the technological frontier requires a shift away from an exclusive emphasis
on developing radical new technologies in the lab and toward a more balanced approach that
involves both breakthrough innovations and incremental product and process innovation.  Thus,
much of the attention of US arms firms seeking to remain at the technological frontier is now
focused on ‘not only the ability to invent new products and technologies [in the R&D lab] but also
the ability to upgrade and improve those products and manufacture them as efficiently as possible’.65
As Japanese (and more recently American) automobile and electronics firms have demonstrated,
such incremental product and process innovations can be a powerful source of technological
dynamism and commercial success.  American arms producers are hoping that by introducing agile
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production they can blur the distinctions between the factory floor and the R&D lab, with the result
that product and process innovation will be intensified while design-to-field cycles are shortened.
Agile manufacturing is also intended to enhance the technological capacity of the US arms industry
by breaking down the barriers separating the civil and military technology and industrial bases.  A
key element of the agile manufacturing vision is the creation of a unified national technology and
industrial base comprising agile firms and virtual enterprises capable of servicing the military and
commercial markets with equal facility.  Thus, the current restructuring must be seen as extending
beyond the existing arms industry to encompass the civil manufacturing base as well.  Indeed, in the
long-run, agile manufacturing will necessarily involve a blurring of the practical and conceptual
lines separating military and civil firms.  If the agile manufacturing vision is realized, in the next
century there will no longer be distinctive firms servicing segregated markets, only inherently agile
‘generic’ firms capable of rapidly forming virtual enterprises to produce increasingly knowledge
intensive commercial or military goods to order.
A second general conclusion that can be drawn from the literature dealing with the shift to lean
production is that the process of military-industrial transformation in the US is clearly conditioned
by civilian best-practices.  Faced with changes in both the nature of military technology and the
regulatory framework governing arms production, American arms firms have not developed a new
labour process ab initio.  Rather, they have adopted a series of process changes modelled on their
perception of the ‘lean production’ techniques that had evolved in the Japanese automobile industry
during the 1960 and 1970s and that became paradigmatic in the US automotive sector during the
mid- to late-1980s.  From continuous process improvement to JIT and concurrent engineering, the
‘Japanisation’ of American labour processes has been a defining element of the transformation of
the US arms industry.
Third, while the process of transformation is far from complete, the transition to postfordist
production techniques in the arms industry appears to have accelerated significantly over the last
five years, at least at the prime contractor and sub-contractor levels.66  Ten years ago, only a handful
of arms producers were involved in any sort of restructuring at the shop floor level beyond the
introduction of a few programmable manufacturing technologies.  Since the early 1990s, however,
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all of the top ten prime contractors, as well as many of the larger subcontractors, have initiated
restructuring programmes.  While the introduction of new manufacturing technologies remains an
important part of this process, restructuring initiatives aimed at introducing postfordist labour
processes such as JIT, continuous process improvement, and concurrent engineering are proliferating
rapidly.  Whether adopted at a stroke, or introduced gradually through ‘pilot’ or ‘pathfinder’
programmes, postfordist labour processes are increasingly common in all sub-sectors of the US
armaments industry.
A fourth set of conclusions that can be drawn from this overview is that the US arms industry is
somewhere in the late experimental phase of the industrial transition cycle.  While progress is being
made toward the evolution and implementation of a new arms production paradigm, it is widely
recognized that the arms industry is still a long way from realising the agile vision of a ‘seamless’
web of military and civil firms, linked by computer-integrated design systems, that are organized
to fit a particular market opportunity and can function as an integrated whole capable of responding
rapidly to customer needs.  In this regard, the most that can be said is that we are now in a period
of intense experimentation with new postfordist technologies, techniques and organisational forms.
While the vision of ‘agile manufacturing’ is guiding this process, and while islands of postfordist
production have emerged, it is still too early to claim that the structural transformation of the US
arms industry has been completed.  A more accurate claim is that the US arms industry is currently
in an early phase of what history suggests will be an extended process of industrial transformation.
A final conclusion is that, although the diffusion of lean production practices is being driven
primarily by changes in the mode of warfare, and conditioned by the demonstration effect of changes
in the automotive industry, it is clear that state military-industrial policy is at least partly responsible
for the widespread experimentation with postfordist production techniques that characterizes the
current era.  Programmes such as the Lean Aircraft Initiative and the Agile Manufacturing Initiative,
coupled with changes in the regulatory environment such as the Federal Acquisition Streamlining
Act, have acted both to spur and enable the development and diffusion of postfordist production
practices through the US arms industry.  It is worth noting in this connection that, as during the
evolution of the armoury system in the nineteenth century, the US government’s promotion of a new
vision of arms production (agile manufacturing) now seems to be driving a restructuring of the
broader civil production base.
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Efforts to improve flexibility, shorten design-to-field cycles, and minimize waste have begun to
remove many of the longstanding barriers to cost-efficient batch/custom production in the US
armaments sector, even as the technological density of modern weapons continues to increase.
While technical and organisational restructuring is still of relatively recent origin (dating primarily
from the early 1990s), their effects are already discernable in the form of reduced unit costs,
improved product quality, and accelerated rates of product and process innovation.  Continuation
of the current trend in restructuring, and the diffusion of agile manufacturing techniques throughout
the US arms industry not only constitute the real ‘quiet revolution’ in the arms industry; they also
promise to unleash the full destructive power of the emerging mode of warfare and thus make a
major contribution to the ability of the United States to sustain military superiority into the next
century.
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